US biosecurity board speaks out on H5N1 concerns

When the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) requested that two papers on H5N1 influenza virus appearing in the journals Science and Nature had key information about the experimental method redacted, scientists across the globe recoiled at this stark development in the restriction of scientific results.

Now the NSABB has published a lengthy explanation of its request in Nature, outlining the concerns it had about the potential misuse of the research.

The subject of the request were two papers dealing with a highly pathogenic avian influenza A/H5N1 which two separate teams of researchers we able to mutate such that it enabled mammal-to-mammal transmission.

The NSABB board write that while such research can be of tremendous benefit in understanding and combating a pandemic outbreak of avian influenza, the information in the papers also had the potential to be misused, describing the consequences as “catastrophic”.

In light of this, the NSABB performed risk assessment weighing the benefits of releasing the information from the potential harms should it be misused.

“Risk assessment of public harm is challenging because it necessitates consideration of the intent and capability of those who wish to do harm, as well as the vulnerability of the public and the status of public-health preparedness for both deliberate and accidental events,” they write.

“We found the potential risk of public harm to be of unusually high magnitude.

“In formulating our recommendations to the government, scientific journals and to the broader scientific community, we tried to balance the great risks against the benefits that could come from making the details of this research known.

“Because the NSABB found that there was significant potential for harm in fully publishing these results and that the harm exceeded the benefits of publication, we therefore recommended that the work not be fully communicated in an open forum.

“The NSABB was unanimous that communication of the results in the two manuscripts it reviewed should be greatly limited in terms of the experimental details and results.”

The main concern was that “publishing these experiments in detail would provide information to some person, organization or government that would help them to develop similar mammal-adapted influenza A/H5N1 viruses for harmful purposes.”

The board decided that releasing the papers with some details redacted was the best compromise, allowing the greatest benefit from the research while mitigating the greatest risks.

They also endorsed the temporary moratorium on further highly pathogenic H5N1 research

“This moratorium would run until consensus is reached on the balance that must be struck between academic freedom and protecting the greater good of humankind from potential danger.

“With proper diligence and rapid achievement of a consensus on a proper path forward, this could have little detrimental effect on scientific progress but significant effect on diminishing risk.”

The comment piece by the NSABB board was published today in Nature.